Approved For Release 702 P/21S 2/4 Rt 29 00975A004700320001-4

25X1


7 October 1959

Copy No. C 65

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700320001-4

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 October 1959

25X1

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

UAR President Nasir at a tripartite conference which King Saud has been trying to arrange since his early September talks with Nasir in Cairo. Husayn's decision resulted from a new propaganda battle between Cairo and Amman radios on the subject of resistance to Communism—a controversy which has arrested the recent trend toward a detente between the UAR and Jordan. Jordanian broadcasts commenting on UAR efforts to rally the Arab world against Communism had charged that it was the UAR which initially "opened the door" to Communism in the Middle East. Cairo's Voice of the Arabs replied on 3 October by referring to Jordan as an opportunist" following "orders of imperialists" who are aligned with Communists against Arab nationalism.

25X1

25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T009754004700320001-4 Yemen: The director general of the Yemeni Foreign Ministry told the American charge on 3 October that the Yemeni 25X1 treasury is "virtually empty," and requested urgent American assistance] The charge reports the consensus of Western representatives in Taiz that Yemen is approaching bankruptcy and that the Imam's dominant position will be endangered unless the government can soon find an estimated \$3,000,000 to \$5,000,000 to tide it over. The Yemeni director general will be visiting Moscow this month, at which time the USSR may seek to bolster 25X1 its influence in Yemen by offering economic assistance. India: Prime Minister Nehru told Ambassador Bunker on 2**5**% 1 24 September that the immediate cause of the Sino-Indian border problem is Peiping's irritation over India's treatment of the Dalai Lama, but that eventually there would have been trouble over the border anyway. Nehru said the Chinese have always had an "ag-25X1 gressive nature," which manifests itself particularly when the 25**X** Chinese feel powerful as a nation, and that they consider Indians to be "second class." Indonesia: /Chinese Communist pressures on the Indonesian Government to repeal a decree banning foreign retail merchants 25X1 in rural areas of Indonesia have been "terrific," according to Foreign Minister Subandrio. The Chinese ambassador has argued the issue heatedly with Subandrio, and leaders of the Chinese Communist community have threatened to bring down the government by economic retaliation. Sukarno is reported to have been shocked by the unfriendly Chinese attitude. 25X1 25X1 III. THE WEST 25X1 Ecuador: Guayaquil is the stronghold of opposition elements, and a center of economic unrest, which the Communists are attempting to exploit with new 7 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF ii

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700320001-4

25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700320001-4

25X1	tility toward Ponce	The city, Ecuador's largest, displa during his last visit there in July. Intensive violence which threatened the	n June it
DΚ	oligarchy in Panam on 5 October. Hund gruntled groups too	nic dissatisfaction with the traditional resulted in a "hunger march" on the dreds of unemployed workers and othe part in a demonstration to demand belief measures by the newly convened	e capital er dis- enact-
	2	5X1	

7 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia Under Strong Chinese Communist Pressure to
Repeal Anti-Chinese Measure 25X1
25/\
Immediately before his departure for Peiping on 4 October,
Foreign Minister Subandrio informed the American ambassador
that Communist China was exerting "terrific" pressure for re-
peal of an Indonesian decree requiring withdrawal of alien mer-
chants from rural areas. He said the Chinese Communist am-
bassador in Djakarta would not even listen to Indonesian explana-
tions of the measure. Leaders of the Chinese community in In-
donesia have threatened to raise prices to such a level that popu-
lar feeling may force the cabinet to resign. In order to increase
pressure on Djakarta to rescind or postpone carrying out the de-
cree, Peiping may hint to Subandrio that it might slow up its eco-
nomic aid to Indonesia, as well as withdraw offers of military
aid.
[A] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Subandrio stated that regardless of Chinese pressures, he
would stand firm in his talks in Peiping. Although Indonesia
does not desire a "showdown" with Communist China, it is pre-
pared for one if necessary. Subandrio stated that he has Pres-
ident Sukarno's strong support in the position he is taking, and

Subandrio plans to explain to Peiping that the current measure is a phase of Indonesia's "socialization" program. Djakarta apparently hopes to turn alien retail trade in rural areas over to independent Indonesian nationals or to the Indonesian cooperative movement. Theoretically this change would end the usurious hold of the Chinese shopkeeper on the Indonesian peasant and

would strengthen the economic role of the Indonesian business

25X1

25X1

class

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700320001-4	
25/(1	
III. THE WEST	
Violence May Spread in Ecuador	
Guayaquil, Ecuador's largest city, is the stronghold of opposition elements and a center of explosive labor and economic unrest which the Communists are attempting to exploit with aggressive new tactics. The Third-of-June Youth Movement, controlled by Communists and including the youth of two leftist parties, is being used to foment unrest designed to unseat Ponce, disrupt the 11th Inter-American Conference scheduled for Quito in February 1960, and block a possible meeting of American presidents in Guayaquil after the conference. The movement was behind the 1 October riots and is planning demonstrations for 9 October.	
Extensive violence in Guayaquil in early June posed the most serious threat to Ponce since his election by a slim plurality in 1956. The city also displayed a deep hostility toward him during his last visit there in July.	25X1
The armed forces, which are believed capable of maintaining order, have canceled invitations to foreign military attaches to attend the 9 October ceremonies, and the local commander reportedly has requested the imposition of martial law?	
	· .

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700320001-4

Panamanian Hunger March Indicative of Social Unrest

The "hunger march" on the Panamanian capital on 5 October by hundreds of unemployed Colon workers and other disgruntled groups was an expression of deep-seated popular resentment against the economic policies of the Panamanian Government. The purpose of the march, led by Colon labor leader Andres Galvan, was to demand the immediate enactment of unemployment relief measures and a minimum wage law by the newly convened National Assembly.

The 50-mile trek to the capital was undertaken by about 600 persons, whose ranks were swelled to approximately 1,000 by the time the orderly procession reached the Legislative Palace. When the National Assembly adjourned for lack of a quorum, marchers occupied the legislative chambers and demonstration leader Galvan exhorted the selfstyled "people's deputies" not to budge until the government enacted the desired legislation. Two and a half hours later National Guardsmen using tear gas ejected the demonstrators and arrested Galvan and other leaders.

Unless immediate measures are taken to improve the

economic situation of Panama's lower and middle classes, further disorders are likely. President de la Guardia frankly acknowledged in his 1 October state-of-the-nation address that Panama currently lacks the economic means to support a rapidly increasing population. With the approach of the May 1960 presidential election, dissident politicians are likely to exploit popular grievances.
L
25X6

25X6

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

